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On the Complexity of
On the Complexity of “Ideas inAmerica”: TheOrigins
and Achievements of the Classical Age of Pragmatism[1]
Few historians disagree that the events surrounding
the Civil War marked a decisive break in American na-
tional development, and few would deny that a key com-
ponent of that break was the elaboration and spread of
new ideas and attitudes about matters of fundamental
importance: nature, science, religion, politics, psychol-
ogy, philosophy, and social organization. In The Meta-
physical Club: A Story of Ideas in America, Louis Menand,
who teaches at the Graduate School of the City Univer-
sity of New York, reexamines the roots of those intellec-
tual changes, their evolution through the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, and their long-term sig-
nificance in American life and thought. “The Civil War
swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it
swept away almost the whole intellectual culture of the
North along with it,” he maintains. “It took nearly half a
century for the United States to develop a culture to re-
place it, to find a set of ideas, and a way of thinking that
would help people cope with the conditions of modern
life.” The long, complex “struggle” to find such an ac-
ceptable new intellectual framework is the subject of his
book (p. x).
The Metaphysical Club concentrates on four tower-
ing, familiar figures -Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (b.1841),
William James (b. 1842), Charles Sanders Peirce (b.
1839), and John Dewey (b.1859) - along the way inte-
grating briefer accounts of the lives and contributions of
more than a dozen other major pre- and -post Civil War
thinkers. The book artfully synthesizes personal biog-
raphy, family history, local culture, and individual psy-
chology with broad currents of popular culture, genera-
tional tensions, international scientific and philosophic
discourse, and the massive political and social trans-
formations that came with industrialism, America’s ex-
panding role in world affairs, and the onset of an ever
more relentless modernism. The result is a compelling
narrative, as captivating in its telling as it is illuminat-
ing in its content. Without sacrificing depth or detail,
and without compromising his analysis’s complexity or
subtlety, Menand gives us a lucid, insightful, and ab-
sorbing reexamination of the intellectual origins of our
modernist/post-modernist world.
Menand divides his book into five parts. Each of
the first four focuses on one of his four major figures,
exploring his life and intellectual development into the
first years of the twentieth century. The fifth part exam-
ines subsequent elaborations of the ideas that they ad-
vanced and seeks to understand their impact on Ameri-
can thought through the rest of the century.
The book’s deeper structure falls into three distinct
sections. The first (the three parts dealing with Holmes,
James, and Peirce) is a sensitive, brilliant exploration of
the complex social - especially the local cultural and in-
terpersonal - origins of the underlying concerns, ideas,
ambitions, and strategies that evolved into American
pragmatism. Menand recreates the intellectual and cul-
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tural world of pre- and post-Civil War Boston and Cam-
bridge, exploring the interrelated lives of an influential
but nevertheless peripheral intellectual elite in a time of
deep sectional conflict and moral crisis. Holmes, the ar-
dent young abolitionist sympathizer and thrice-wounded
Union officer, learns from the horrors of war to distrust
and scorn moral absolutes and “certainties” of all types.
James, the indecisive would-be scientist who refused to
join the Union army and thereby missed “the defining
experience of his generation” (p. 74), learns to satisfy
his own emotional needs by exploiting the openness, un-
certainty, and contingency that he finds in newly domi-
nant evolutionary theory. Peirce, an intellectual prodigy
whose life was scarred by a painful neurological disor-
der that led him to drug addiction and a career marked
by erratic and self-destructive actions, learns from statis-
tical theory that randomness does not necessarily mean
disorder and that human knowledge was not a “mirror”
of nature but the product of “social” consensus.
At the end of this first section, we find Menand’s
chapter on the “Metaphysical Club,” the legendary, short-
lived discussion group in Cambridge, Massachusetts in
the early 1870s that brought togethermany of the “found-
ing fathers” of American pragmatism - not only Holmes,
James, and Peirce but also such key, albeit less well-
known, figures as Chauncey Wright and Nicholas St.
John Green.
It was in the context of that group that Peirce ex-
plored the implications of the randomness of the uni-
verse and the contingency of human reasoning and
that he reached his conclusion about the “social” nature
of human knowledge, one of pragmatism’s foundation
ideas and his “most important contribution to American
thought” (p. 200). The chapter, and this long substantive
first section, concludeswith the end of “TheMetaphysical
Club” itself, which began to “pull apart” in the summer of
1872 and collapsed with the premature deaths of Wright
(d. 1875) and Green (d. 1876). The club’s demise, Menand
suggests, was symbolic: though traceable to a plethora of
personal and individual factors, it was also the result of
an institutionalizing, professionalizing, and modernizing
society. “In the end, the Metaphysical Club unraveled
because Harvard University was reformed” (p. 230).
The book’s second substantive section, the last and
longest of the first four parts, begins with a discussion
of Dewey’s early education in Burlington, Vermont, but
it soon broadens - like Dewey’s career and philosophy -
from the local and personal to the national and public.
Almost twenty years younger than Holmes, James, and
Peirce, Dewey was the progeny of significantly different
intellectual and cultural traditions. Born in small-town
Vermont, the son of a Unionist storekeeper and a socially
active but orthodox Congregationalist mother, he was
far removed from the prestigious, interconnected intel-
lectual circles of Boston and Cambridge (p. 250). Again
unlike the others, he was a product of the emerging mod-
ern American university system - secular, scientifically
based, nationally oriented, and professionally directed -
that had helped destroy the local, private “Metaphysi-
cal Club.” Dewey “reached maturity as a thinker at ex-
actly the moment American social and economic life was
tipping over into modern forms of organization, forms
whose characteristics reflect the effects of size: imper-
sonal authority, bureaucratic procedure, mass markets”
(p. 236). Those differences proved crucial. “Unlike al-
most every other serious thinker of his time,” Menand
declares, Dewey “was at home in modernity” (p. 237).
Also unlike Menand’s other three thinkers, and most
important for the future of pragmatism, Dewey turned
to politics and social activism, in large part because his
professional academic career took him to the University
of Chicago in 1894, the year of the Pullman Strike. There
he met, among others, Jane Addams, the founder of Hull
House, who exerted a compelling influence on the new
chairman of the university’s philosophy department. Ad-
dams not only pulled Dewey into the world of politi-
cal and social reform, but convinced him that “the resis-
tance the world puts up to our actions and desires is not
the same as a genuine opposition of interests” (p. 313).
In other words, she persuaded Dewey of the fundamen-
tal compatibility of human desires and interests when
properly understood; for the next half-century, Dewey
used the tools of pragmatism to show how and why that
principle could illuminate and resolve political and social
problems of all kinds. Thus, Menand uses Dewey’s career
to explore the vital confrontation that occurred in the late
nineteenth century between the philosophical ideas that
were crystallizing into pragmatism and the multiplying
challenges that came to America with industrialization
and modernization.
The book’s third substantive section (its fifth part
and a brief “Epilogue”) carries pragmatism’s history from
around 1904 to the end of the twentieth century. It re-
counts the brief remaining careers of James (d. 1910) and
Peirce (d. 1914) as well as the longer, more publicly vis-
ible careers of Holmes (d. 1935) and Dewey (d. 1964).
Further, it introduces and evaluates some of the quar-
tet’s principal successors. Finally, it seeks to identify the
ways that the ideas of Holmes, James, Peirce, and Dewey
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helped to shape American thought through the rapidly
changing world of the later twentieth century. Menand
explores the variations that marked the distinct “prag-
matisms” they developed, focusing on their contributions
to democratic theory, to emerging ideas of political and
cultural pluralism, and to expanding ideas of human free-
dom, especially those involving free speech and academic
freedom. “The political system their philosophy was de-
signed to support was democracy,” he explains, and per-
haps their greatest achievement was to help “make toler-
ance an official virtue in modern America” (p. 440, and
see also p. 439).
Unlike the book’s earlier sections, Part V’s strength
is its thematic unity - not its depth, detail, or insight into
individual thinkers. Indeed, it is necessarily thinner in its
analysis and even somewhat arbitrary in its selection of
issues and individuals. It is also unbalanced chronologi-
cally.
Although it discusses a few important developments
in the 1920s and 1930s (such as the Supreme Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence and early battles over
academic freedom), it skims over the century’s final six
decades, ignoring in the process major phases in the con-
tinuing history of pragmatism in American thought.
II.
Menand announces in his “Preface” that Holmes,
James, Peirce, and Dewey “were more responsible than
any other group for moving American thought into the
modern world” (p. xi). “Their challenge, as they per-
ceived it, was to devise a theory of conduct that made
sense in a universe of uncertainty” (p. 214). Acknowl-
edging, indeed highlighting, differences among them, he
nonetheless isolates what he considers the intellectual
core they shared, “their attitude toward ideas.” What they
“had in common was not a group of ideas, but a single
idea - an idea about ideas.” He expands on this point (pp.
xi-xii):
“They all believed that ideas are not ”out there“ wait-
ing to be discovered, but are tools - like forks and knives
and microchips - that people devise to cope with the
world in which they find themselves. They believed that
ideas are produced not by individuals, but by groups of
individuals - that ideas are social. They believed that
ideas do not develop according to some inner logic of
their own, but are entirely dependent, like germs, on
their human carriers and the environment. And they be-
lieved that since ideas are provisional responses to par-
ticular and unreproducible circumstances, their survival
depends not on their immutability but on their adaptabil-
ity.”
Menand’s statement captures many key assumptions
behind pragmatism: that ideas are instrumental, socially
created, environmentally dependent, and both changing
and changeable.
Menand tells us that his book “is an effort to write
about these ideas in their own spirit - that is, to try to
see ideas as always soaked through by the personal and
social situations in which we find them” (p. xii). His sim-
iles reinforce his methodology. Ideas are neither sacred
nor transcendent but rather ordinary, entirely real-world
phenomena, like “forks” and “germs.” As attentive as the
book is to ideas and their interconnections, it ultimately
insists that their origin, evolution, and fate was deter-
mined by the way they did or did not “fit” with social
needs and conditions (see, e.g., p. 369).
The book’s major achievement is its subtle, complex,
modulated explanation of pragmatism’s human origins:
pragmatism “was the product of a group of individu-
als, and it took its shape from the way they bounced
off one another, their circumstances, and the myster-
ies of their unreproducible personalities” (p. 371). In
other words, the book does not limit itself to examin-
ing changes in philosophical schools, concepts, and argu-
ments, nor rest content with discussions of pragmatism’s
intellectual roots and fostering social context.
Nor does it suggest that personal elements - even
such powerful factors as Holmes’s devastating experi-
ences in the Civil War and James’s debilitating religious
and psychological crises - were, by themselves, decisive.
Rather, it attempts to integrate all those considerations,
and many others as well, into a comprehensive, finely-
grained analysis of the lived experiences of an extraordi-
nary group of individuals and to show when, why, and
how their varied needs, concerns, anxieties, and ambi-
tions combined in the specific historical context of post-
Civil War America to move their thoughts and feelings
in certain new directions.
Menand’s discussion of his major figures’ personal
and family backgrounds is subtle and illuminating. Es-
chewing summaries, he considers the lives, aspirations,
and beliefs of friends, colleagues, and family members,
suggesting the variety of influences they exerted. Not
surprisingly, he focuses on the respective roles played
by three unusually distinguished and accomplished fa-
thers: the physician, scientist, and essayist Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Sr.; the eccentric, anti-establishment reli-
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gious seeker and writer Henry James the elder; and the
internationally-recognized mathematician and Harvard
professor Benjamin Peirce. Menand is equally sensitive
to the divisions that developed between generations, and
he marks the extent to which historical change, genera-
tional conflict, and idiosyncratic personal characteristics
cut off the fathers from their sons. Although Peirce re-
mained loyal to his father’s values and attitudes, James
and Holmes drifted ever farther from those of their fa-
thers. “The usual biographical practice has been to as-
sume continuity,” Menand writes of the relationship be-
tween the Jameses, “but the social history suggests rup-
ture” (p. 84). Tracing a growing split between Holmes
and his father, Menand generalizes: “Holmes’s rejection
of the intellectual style of pre-war Boston mirrored a
generational shift. To many of the men who had been
through thewar, the values of professionalism and exper-
tise were attractive; they implied impersonality, respect
for institutions as efficient organizers of enterprise, and a
modern and scientific attitude - the opposites of the indi-
vidualism, humanitarianism, and moralism that charac-
terized Northern intellectual life before the war” (p. 59).
Exploring the complex ways that ideas interact and
evolve, Menand highlights a wide range of connections.
In a few scattered pages, for example, he suggests Emer-
son’s role in the pre-war period and marks his continued,
if diluted, significance in the post-war era. “Holmes’s
posture of intellectual isolation was, after all, essentially
Emersonian,” he points out (p. 68), noting further that
pragmatism “shares Emerson’s distrust of institutions
and systems, and hismanner of appropriating ideaswhile
discarding their philosophical foundations” (p. 370, and
see also p. 89). More broadly, Menand joins those schol-
ars who emphasize the continuing, widespread influence
of religion in nineteenth-century America. Protestant
Christianity in its varying formswas an essential element
in the upbringing of all of his characters, even the few -
such as the Holmeses - who seemed immune from its spe-
cific claims. It was an unavoidable force field that helped
shape their characters and beliefs even as they tried to
reconceive its foundations or reject its authority. Indeed,
Menand explains, “the splintering of American Protes-
tantism into multiple religious and quasi-religious sects
over the course of the [nineteenth] century - the Protes-
tantization, so to speak of Protestantism - is part of the
larger, more inchoate context out of which pragmatism
emerged” (p. 89).
Menand is especially informative in his discussion of
the scientific context in which his figures, particularly
James and Peirce, matured. Most striking, his chapter
on “The Law of Errors,” tracing the development of sta-
tistical theory in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, provides a particularly enlightening account of
a series of scientific advances that informed the think-
ing of the early pragmatists. Probability theory attracted
them because it seemed capable of reconciling two fun-
damental, conflicting ideas, that life was marked by ran-
domness and contingency and that a knowable order ex-
isted in nature. “The broader appeal of statistics lay in the
idea of an order beneath apparent randomness” (p. 194).
Statistics, moreover, exerted a particularly powerful ap-
peal for James and Peirce, Menand suggests, because it
offered a natural order that was scientifically knowable
but still only “probabilistic” and not “deterministic.”
Perhapsmost unusual,TheMetaphysical Club stresses
the impact of slavery and racism on American life and
thought. Although few would question the general im-
portance of either factor, histories of the more elevated
types of thought often minimize or ignore their signifi-
cance. Menand, however, highlights their constant pres-
ence and implies their pervasive importance. Scientific
inquiry in the United States before and after Darwin,
he shows, was driven in significant part by racist as-
sumptions, shaping, for example, the work of such a
distinguished practitioner as Agassiz, the dean of mid-
nineteenth-century American science and the teacher of
both James and Peirce. Similarly, Holmes’s father and
grandfather, the Jameses, and the Peirces all accepted
racist assumptions in one form or another, as did many
of the epigones who enter the story as it reaches the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, includ-
ing the labor leader Eugene V. Debs (whose American
Railway Union did not admit blacks) and Dewey’s cul-
tural acolyte, Horace M. Kallen (whose idea of a national
“melting pot” was based on the premise that individual
character was determined by an “immutable” race factor).
Indeed, Menand explores the “pluralist” implications of
pragmatism by focusing on the way that later thinkers,
especially Kallen and Alain Locke (a black writer best
known for his work on the Harlem Renaissance), used
Dewey’s work to try to deal with problems of racial and
ethnic division in American society. “Only in Dewey’s
conception does the specter of race completely disap-
pear,” Menand maintains, because “he insisted that di-
visions are just temporary alignments within a common
whole” (p. 407).
III.
For legal and constitutional historiansTheMetaphysi-
cal Club offers a rich, thoughtful discussion of intellectual
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developments crucial to the evolution of American law
and jurisprudence. More specifically, it illuminates three
issues that legal historians have frequently addressed.
First, and most generally, it confirms a familiar if
nonetheless fundamental lesson. Although addressing
a different historical period and different substantive is-
sues, it shows exactly what Jack Rakove showed in his
excellent book,Original Meanings[2]: that historical phe-
nomena -whether ideas and events, or legal enactments
and opinions - are deeply and inextricably embedded in
a complex, profoundly human context. The relationship
between human behavior and formal norms and deci-
sions, Menand suggests, is complex, varied, individual,
and only imperfectly knowable. Thus, any theory that
posits an objective, knowable, and specifically directive
“original intent” as a general basis for interpreting the
Constitution must ultimately be unsatisfying and nuga-
tory. It must either rely for purposes of expedience on
assumptions that are simplified, tractable, and to some
extent arbitrary, or it must rest content with results that
are vague, non-determinative, and ultimately inadequate
to the theory’s prescriptive claims.
Menand also demonstrates, however, as Rakove did,
that the proper lesson to be drawn from a recognition
of historical complexity is double-edged. If historical
inquiry can seldom provide answers to specific, fairly
contested constitutional questions, it can nevertheless
yield its own rich, salient harvest. When thoroughly re-
searched and deeply informed, when sensitive and ex-
acting, and when fair and honest, it can yield the kind
of profound insights and deep understanding that under-
write sound practical judgment and, on occasion, even
inspire wisdom about the conduct of human affairs.
Second, Menand highlights a fundamental element in
the intellectual transformation that occurred during the
nineteenth century: a radical reconception and redefini-
tion of “science” itself. Commenting on Gray’s triumph
over Agassiz in their debate about Darwinism, for exam-
ple, Menand stresses the nature of the divide that sep-
arated them: “Gray understood something that Agassiz
did not, whichwas that therewere new rules for scientific
argument” (p. 126). Gray “was thinking in terms of re-
lations and probabilities,” while Agassiz “was still think-
ing in terms of types and ideas.” It was Gray’s new un-
derstanding, subsequently developed by Peirce and then
transferred into legal theory by Green and Holmes, that
swept the field in the twentieth century, while Agassiz’s
understanding came to seem outmoded, rationalistic, and
even obscurantist (pp. 222-226).
Recognizing the nature of the gulf between the two
makes it easier to understand the analogous change that
transformed American legal thought after Green and
Holmes. In particular, it helps clarify the nature and
reality of the “legal science” that so many nineteenth-
century legal writers proclaimed and practiced. Modern
legal scholars often have been reluctant to credit their
forebears with being “legal scientists,” but Menand helps
us understand why those earlier writers so perceived
themselves, how later generations came to understand
the term “science” in such a new, radically different way,
and why, consequently, those later generations had dif-
ficulty understanding the nature of nineteenth-century
“legal science.”[3]
Finally, The Metaphysical Club suggests the “thick,”
intertwined roots of the cultural commitments to indi-
vidualism, the “free market,” and private contract that
marked mid- and late-nineteenth-century America. By
showing that human behavior in the aggregate con-
formed to certain patterns, Darwinism and statistical the-
ory seemed to coincide in showing “that things regulated
themselves” (p. 194). That conclusion, in turn, “was taken
to confer a kind of cosmic seal of approval on the political
doctrines of individualism and laissez-faire” (id.). Racist
assumptions cemented the consensus. Huxley and oth-
ers helped formulate “a theology for the postslavery era”
(p. 195) by arguing that natural selection showed that the
“white man” was superior to the black and that he could
“wash his hands” (id.) of any responsibility for racial in-
equalities. Thus, a powerful matrix of ideas, attitudes, in-
terests, and existing “human arrangements” generated a
deep, widespread belief in a particular, culturally-defined
concept of individual freedom: “Nineteenth-century lib-
erals believed that the market operated like nature be-
cause they had already decided that nature operated like
a market” (id.).
For legal and constitutional historians, the point
seems clear. “Classical legal thought,” “laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism,” and the general jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries did not flow directly from the language of the
Constitution, the original intent of its framers, or the cat-
egories andmethods of the common law.[4] Rather, those
legal phenomena were complex cultural products. They
were the results of many of the same forces that Menand
identifies, as well as many others beyond the scope of his
work, including the politics of judicial appointment, the
emergence of an ethnically diverse industrial work force,
the rise and triumph of large-scale corporate capitalism,
and the changing nature, structure, and social composi-
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tion of the legal profession itself.
Those intertwined jurisprudential phenomena, fur-
thermore, were the result of conscious and individual hu-
man purposes as well as cultural presumptions. Menand
offers as evidence of his claim about the influence of
classical economic theory an opinion of William Howard
Taft, then a federal circuit judge, sentencing one of the
leaders of the Pullman strike to a six-month prison term
for contempt.[5] Although the opinion shows the influ-
ence of classical economic theory, it also suggests Taft’s
individual values and biases. Other opinions that he
wrote establish that Taft was an able legal craftsman who
could and did purposefully manipulate legal concepts to
achieve the specific social results he desired.[6] That im-
portant if unsurprising conclusion is, of course, consis-
tent with two ofMenand’s basic pragmatic premises: that
individuals act to serve purposes, and that each individ-
ual has a unique life experience and, consequently, may
think, decide, and take action in his or her own distinct
and even singular way.
TheMetaphysical Club thus highlights one of the fun-
damental problems in contemporary American jurispru-
dence: the meaning, nature, and reality of “the rule of
law.” An acute challenge to legal and constitutional the-
ory, the problem of “the rule of law” now presents equally
a challenge to contemporary American politics and in-
stitutions. The broadest significance of Bush v. Gore,[7]
after all, is that the Supreme Court of the United States
had a breathtaking opportunity to demonstrate that “the
rule of law” existed and worked; that legal principles and
practices did, in fact, limit and channel judicial judgment;
that law and politics were, indeed, distinct and contrast-
ing arenas. And yet, when taken to the mountaintop
and shown the riches and glories of the presidency of
the United States, it succumbed. Thus, Menand’s basic
premises - and the premises of pragmatism - seem once
again both incisive and well-founded. We would, indeed,
seem to be living in the world that the classical age of
pragmatism helped create and shape.
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